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Following the results of the referendum, in which 63.8% of voters appear to have
approved the text, the new Egyptian constitution is now the law of the land.  The
turnout was far lower than anyone expected, with just over 32.9% of the population
making their way to the polls, which means that the constitution has been approved
by a mere 21% of eligible voters, clearly not a resounding victory for its proponents.
The poor showing will have a number of consequences, including the prospect
that the new constitution’s popular legitimacy may be challenged for some time to
come, which in turn will detract from the effort to resolve many of the more pressing
problems that Egypt is facing today.
The debate surrounding the new constitution has been acrimonious to say the
least.  Many of the constitution’s most ardent critics have been scouring the text
for evidence that the country’s Islamist movements are preparing to create a
morality police or that the legal age of marriage is about to be lowered to 9.  Many
of these accusations are either baseless or merely leftover provisions from the
1971 constitution and were never applied in any meaningful sense, which will likely
to continue being the case under the new constitution.  The reality is that, when
measured against Egyptian constitutional tradition, the new text brings a number of
improvements to the protection of certain rights and to the system of government
and is not the catastrophe that many have been so determined to identify.
However, if the measure is changed, there are perfectly valid reasons to be
opposed to the new constitution.  For example, considering recent developments
internationally in the field of constitutional law, particularly in many African and Latin
American countries, or considering even the aspirations that were expressed through
the Egyptian revolution, the text leaves the reader disappointed.
Apart from the fact that much of the drafting is vague, a number of important rights
are also lacking, which has driven many activists to ardently oppose the text.  It also
does not present a convincing vision in many areas, including decentralization, the
role of independent agencies and civil/military relations.
The purpose of this contribution is to discuss some of the new constitution’s
most salient features, including the system of government, the role of religion,
the protection that the text affords to certain rights, civil/military relations and
decentralization.  Firstly however, the drafting process itself is deserving of some
discussion considering the impact that it has had on the manner in which the text is
being perceived in the country.
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A flawed process
One of the more remarkable aspects of Egypt’s constitution-drafting process is
that it is the country’s first by an elected body.  Like so many other Arab countries,
Egypt’s past constitutions have been the exclusive product of secret drafting
sessions by unrepresentative and unelected political elites (to date, the only other
obvious exceptions are the ongoing Tunisian and Libyan processes, and the Iraqi
constitution, although the latter was drafted under military occupation).  In that
sense, the Egyptian process was in itself an accomplishment.  After the election
of a new parliament early in 2012, the lower house nominated a 100-member
constituent assembly to draft the constitution.  There was significant controversy in
how those 100 individuals were selected: the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Freedom
and Justice Party (FJP) considered it justified on translating its electoral success
to domination of the assembly, whereas the opposition stressed that because
parliamentary majorities were transitory, the assembly’s makeup should reflect
all aspects of Egyptian society.  In the end, the FJP had its way, which is what
guaranteed the fact that, regardless of any disagreements within the assembly, it
would in any event be able to complete its work.
Fatally, the assembly opted to use the 1971 constitution and existing traditions as a
starting point for its deliberations.  The effect is that while the new constitution claims
to be a product of the people’s will, it is heavily influenced by the preceding decades
of autocratic rule. So much so that many articles have simply been reproduced
verbatim in the final text. Thus, although the new constitution solves some of the
country’s more important problems (including the absence of presidential term limits
and a parliament without effective power), its insistence on seeking inspiration from
the 1971 constitution means that the same lapses recur, and the same arms-length
relationship between the state and the people is maintained (the strongest evidence
of this is the deeply flawed chapter on decentralization; see below).
All this is in stark contrast to the Tunisian constituent assembly, which took a
decision early on to set aside the miscarried 1959 constitution and to start with a
blank page.  The Tunisian assembly published its first complete draft just a few
weeks ago, and it marks a clear departure from the past: the assembly is making a
genuine effort to respond to the past’s failures as opposed to repeating them.
Perhaps one of President Morsi’s biggest mistakes was the decision to maintain
the drafting process that had been established by the Supreme Council of the
Armed Forces (SCAF) in March 2011.  The SCAF, clearly not expert in democratic
transition, imposed a 6 month timeframe for the entire constitutional drafting process,
precisely because it did not understand the challenges that Egypt was faced with
or because it preferred not to see those challenges met.  Constitutional drafting
is difficult in any context, but is particularly complex when it involves multiparty
negotiations.  In a revolutionary context, there is little prospect of drafting a modern
constitution in 6 months precisely because so much needs to be changed and
because parties have to consult internally and with each other on every issue. 
The 6 month deadline was always going to be extremely problematic, which is why
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President Morsi should have revisited the March 2011 interim constitution as soon as
he assumed his powers in June 2012.
There were many alternatives for him to choose from, including the Tunisian model
which is currently proceeding with significantly more success than that of Egypt.
  In the end, meeting the deadline became one of the process’ essential goals,
regardless of what it meant for the prospects for national unity.  In the process, the
negotiations reached a state of hysteria before eventually collapsing altogether:
after a series of acrimonious accusations on all sides, practically every non-Islamist
member of the constituent assembly withdrew, which has laid the basis for the
constitution’s legitimacy to be questioned far into the future.
An all powerful president?
One of the claims that have been repeated indefatigably over the past few weeks
is that the new constitution is designed to allow for a Muslim Brotherhood president
to dominate the political process and impose an Islamist agenda regardless of
how other institutions are made up.  However, an honest reading of the text does
not support that accusation.  If the constitution’s system of government is applied
literally, the days of outright domination by a strong executive are essentially over.
  The parliament is given significant authority in the government formation and
dismissal process; it is protected from arbitrary dissolution and has important
oversight powers; and the president’s authority to declare a state of emergency
has been limited.  At the same time however, the president still has the authority to
involve himself in areas that he should not be involved in.
One of the constituent assembly’s stated objectives from the start was to limit
the presidency’s powers in order to avoid the emergence of a new ‘pharaoh’ who
could come to dominate the country for the coming few decades.  In that sense,
the new constitution can be said to have achieved its objective.  It clearly imposes
term limits (article 133).  The president must now also collaborate very closely with
the parliament during the government formation process, and any government
must present its programme to the parliament to be approved (article 139).  The
parliament itself is also empowered to dismiss the government, the prime minister or
any individual minister by a simple majority of its members (article 126).  Under the
1971 constitution, the parliament could only dismiss the government after obtaining
the president’s approval or if the vote of no confidence obtained a two-thirds majority
(article 127).  Strong mechanisms are also afforded to parliamentary minorities by
giving individual members the right to request information or to demand a statement
from the government or even to interrogate the prime minister in relation to urgent
matters of public importance (articles 123-125).   Finally, the constitution imposes
strong restrictions on the president’s power to call a state of emergency, and on the
powers that the president can exercise during that period (article 148).
Some habits die hard however and the president still has more power, particularly
in relation to the nuts and bolts of government, than is appropriate in the
circumstances. By way of example, the president still has the power to appoint 1/10
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members of the upper chamber of parliament (article 128), which gives the president
an unjust and undeserved amount of leverage over the legislative process.
A related issue is that the president is responsible for appointing the heads of all
just about every independent agency in the country, including its audit institution
and the central bank.  Although the appointment has to be approved by the upper
house, given the president’s power to appoint a large portion of its members, the
process is skewed in his favour in ways that are difficult to justify.  The impact is to
limit the independence of each of these institutions at a time when the executive’s
accountability needs to be assessed and measured by institutions that are as
independent as possible.  This is a major flaw that should have been rectified during
the drafting process.
Finally, the judiciary will also continue to check executive and legislative abuses of
authority.  Judicial independence is protected (articles 168 and 170), and a clear
mechanism is provided for the appointment of the public prosecutor in a way that
also safeguards independence (article 173).  The supreme constitutional court is still
exclusively competent to review the constitutionality of laws (article 175).
Regrettably, many of the 1971 constitution’s flaws reemerge in the new text.
  Amongst other things, there is no detail on how judges are to be appointed
or dismissed, nor is any information provided on how their salaries are to be
determined (all essential cornerstones of judicial independence).  Awkwardly also,
although the supreme judicial council (the body that is responsible for overseeing
the functioning of the entire judicial sector) is mentioned in passing in three different
provisions in the constitution, it is never actually defined anywhere.  Obviously, there
is existing legislation in Egypt that govern these areas but the point is that there are
some principles (such as that a judge can only be dismissed in exceptional cases of
misconduct, etc.) that should be immutable and that should have been spelled out
clearly in the constitution.
An Islamic state?
After decades of corruption, mismanagement, brutality and deception, Egypt is in
need of a new set of standards that can guide the state to better serve its people.
  Some hoped the revolution could fill the void, but the elections brought an Islamic
majority to parliament and a president who is affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood,
which considers that religion is the answer.  Their beliefs were translated into
specific constitutional provisions which some in the opposition camp have alleged
establish a religious state in violation of a commitment to maintain the existence of
a “civil state” (see below).  A close reading of the new constitution does not support
that allegation, although there is some worrying wording that is in need of more
clarity.  In summary however, the constitution builds on the notion that Egypt is a
religiously inspired state, but does not actually establish a religious state per se.
As an introductory point, Egypt prior to the revolution was not strictly speaking
a secular state in the western sense of the word, nor was it a religious state. 
Religion has long played an important role in all Arab countries; amongst other
- 4 -
things, family law has always been determined by religious rules, thereby prohibiting
anything resembling a civil marriage.  At the same time, clerics did not occupy
official positions of power within the state, which meant that Egypt could not be
properly described as a religious state either.  In that context, Egypt has newly
been designated as a “civil state”, a generally undefined term but which is generally
understood to mean that the country should be administered and led by civilians
as opposed to military personnel and religious figures.  One of the principal aims
of revolutionary, secular and liberal groups since the start of the uprising in 2011
was that Egypt should remain a ‘civil state’, particularly with a view to ensuring that
the Muslim Brotherhood’s senior clerical leadership would not be given official roles
within the state.
The debate on this issue initially focused on article 2, which was included in the
1971 constitution to mollify Islamists while at the same time creating enough space
for legal interpretation to minimize the provision’s impact.  The provision, which
was eventually maintained word for word in the new constitution, states that “the
principles of Islamic Sharia are the principle source of legislation”.   At the time when
article 2 was initially included, the trick was to specify that it was the “principles”
of Islamic Sharia that would inspire legislation, a term that was both an innovation
and that was left undefined.  Finally, in order to ensure that the provision would be
emptied of any effective meaning, interpretation was left to the courts, which were
not particularly sympathetic to the idea of a religiously inspired state.  In the end,
article 2 was interpreted as referring to a very limited number of principles, which
have barely left their mark on Egyptian state and society.
In June 2012, as the constitutional drafting process commenced, a commitment
was made early on to leave article 2 unchanged.  That agreement was designed to
reassure liberals and others that Egypt was not headed on the path of increased
Islamisation.  However, it was always certain that the Islamist-dominated constituent
assembly would seek to correct the way in which the courts have limited the
application of article 2.  Thus, instead of amending article 2, an additional two
provisions were included in the final text that would determine what the term
“principles” of Islamic Sharia means and who was responsible for interpreting that
term.  Thus, although these two provisions do not literally amend article 2, they
change the manner in which it is to be understood and applied in ways that many
liberal members of the assembly did not originally anticipate.
The two new provisions include article 219, which widens the scope of article
2 considerably beyond what the courts had previously decided.  “Principles of
Islamic Sharia” now includes all the rules of jurisprudence and credible sources
that are accepted in Sunni doctrines, amongst other things.  What this means is
that the entire body of Islamic jurisprudence (a complex body of law that goes back
centuries) is now a source of inspiration for legislation.  The constitution’s detractors
immediately complained that this would force legislators to contemplate sources
of law that are now centuries out of date; many also expressed the concern that
the criminal code would be brought in line with some of the more stringent forms
of Sharia, which include corporal punishment.  Although the jury is still out on how
article 219 will impact on existing and future legislation, there is agreement that the
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entire body of Islamic jurisprudence is sufficiently broad to include various opinions
(some moderate and others more severe) about most issues, which means that
legislators and courts will still have sufficient room to maneuver as they carry out
their work.
Given that Islamic Sharia is such a broad area and that opinions vary within that
body of law, the question as to who is responsible for interpreting Sharia becomes
crucial.  The constituent assembly resolved that matter through article 4, which
states that the opinion of Al-Azhar (one of the Islamic world’s most venerable
institutions) must be obtained on all matters relating to Sharia.  From the provision’s
wording, there is little doubt that such consultation is mandatory and that it must
be sought by all bodies (including the courts and parliament).  The courts therefore
remain responsible for applying and interpreting the law, as well as for ensuring that
legislation is in conformity with the constitution (and by extension to Sharia), but
must now consult al-Azhar.  What remains unclear is the weight that will be attributed
to al-Azhar’s individual opinions.  Article 4 itself clearly indicates that its opinions will
not be binding but some commentators have expressed the concern that a court will
be hard pressed to contradict an opinion that is provided by al-Azhar; at the same
time, the constitution clearly does provide the courts with the scope to disagree with
an opinion by al-Azhar, for whatever reason (including for example if it disagrees
with the opinion’s logic or if it considers that al-Azhar did not consider all the relevant
sources), and does not prohibit the courts from seeking other opinions in relation to
the same matter.
What is more certain however is that these provisions have reinvigorated the
struggle to control al-Azhar and its Council of Senior Scholars.  Decades of
autocratic rule are reputed to have left the institution without teeth.  Despite the
fact that its independence is nominally protected by the constitution, Islamists of all
stripes will seek to influence its makeup over the coming year given the role that it
has been attributed.  One possible means to achieve that is the legislation that the
constitution calls for to organise al-Azhar’s internal affairs.  This will clearly be one
of the first issues that will be addressed after the new parliament is elected in the
coming months, and will draw some of the more important battle lines between the
country’s various camps.
Finally, it is worth dismissing some of the more extravagant theories that have been
expressed about some of the provisions.  In particular, it has been said that article 10
which provides that the “state and society oversee the commitment to the genuine
character of the Egyptian family” was deliberately included in the constitution by
the constituent assembly’s more hardline islamists to allow for the establishment of
morality police that would roam neighborhoods to enforce a traditional and hardline
vision of society.  The reality however is somewhat less ominous: article 10 is copied
almost verbatim from article 9 of the 1971 constitution, a provision that essentially
had no practical impact for decades.  Thus, rather than being a perverse attempt
to establish a Saudi-style religious state by stealth, article 10 is actually the product
of offhand copying and pasting by a constituent assembly that was determined to
meet a short deadline for completion.  Some critics have nevertheless expressed
the concern that under an Islamist administration, article 10 takes on a different
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meaning; that may be so, but it is just as likely that it will in fact remain little more
than symbolic wording with no practical application.
In summary, Egypt’s Islamist rulers have given their spiritual counsellors a role in
inspiring the direction that the state should head in, without actually giving them any
hard political power (the Muslim Brotherhood’s representatives in government are all
professionals, many of whom hold PhDs in science-related subjects, and who have
little desire to hand over power to clerics).  Egypt cannot therefore be described as
a religious state given that political power remains firmly in the hands of civilians, but
religion will now play a real role in inspiring how the state is to function.  Whether that
leads to better governance, less corruption, more hardline punishment or moderation
remains to be seen.
The protection of rights
The protection of fundamental rights under the constitution has been particularly
controversial from the start. The final text imposes a socially conservative vision
of society on the country, is economically progressive but restricts the exercise of
certain rights in way that are not in keeping with best practice or with democratic
ideals.  The controversy has centered mainly on the status of women and on other
rights including freedom of expression.  The text itself is a mixed bag: it is certainly
not as progressive as many western constitutions on social issues (and was never
intended to be), but sets out a number of aspirations on economic rights that will be
hard to beat and almost impossible to implement, at least in the short term.  Some
of the rights are also disorganized and vague, making them sometimes difficult to
understand.
The starting point on women’s rights has to be an honest appreciation of Egyptian
constitutional tradition on this same issue.  Egyptian society, like many others in the
region, is deeply conservative and that has been reflected in its constitutional history.
  The 1971 text (which many commentators today mistakenly consider to have
been a liberal text) included awkward language imposing on women the obligation
to work and to care for their families without imposing any equivalent duties on
men.  The text also did not explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex. 
In 2012, many liberal members of the constituent assembly sought to resolve this
issue firstly by specifically prohibiting sexual discrimination and by removing any
reference to women’s obligations towards their families.  After a number of iterations
and rewordings, liberals appear not to have obtained any concessions.  Although a
provision from an earlier draft that was particularly reviled by civil rights groups was
eventually deleted, most of its provisions reappeared elsewhere.  Some of these
provisions (including article 10) reproduce verbatim the wording the 1971 constitution
had used on this issue, and once again forces upon women obligations towards
family and society without imposing any such role on men.
Thus, although the new constitution probably accurately reflects the values of a
large segment of society on this issue, there is reason for disappointment for several
reasons.  Firstly, although many Egyptians are socially conservative, every woman
(and man) should be free to decide whether to marry or have children without
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the state’s necessarily being involved.  Explicitly calling for the promotion of a
conservative vision of society encroaches on the personal freedom of citizens to
make their own individual choices.
Secondly, constitutions in many post-revolutionary societies are often used to
promote and defend values that are not always necessarily in line with the majority’s
values.  Strong constitutional protections can often spearhead a positive change
in society, or at the very least can defend the rights of the individual against an
overbearing majority.  A case in point is the abolition  of the death penalty in South
Africa despite the fact that it was and remains very popular in many circles.  The
constitutions of Spain, Ecuador, Bolivia, Kenya, etc. all call for strong protections
against gender discrimination, even though societal values do not necessarily agree.
  Progress in Latin America (a famously conservative region) has now reached the
point where several women have been elected head of state in countries where such
a thing was considered impossible just a few decades ago.
Thirdly, stronger protections against gender discrimination in Egypt were always
achievable; other countries with similarly conservative populations have offered
strong safeguards, including the current Tunisian constituent assembly which finally
accepted, after significant pressure from civil society, that gender discrimination
should be explicitly forbidden.  Egypt’s new constitution will therefore come as a
disappointment to those members of civil society who might have been able to
influence the outcome with the right type of access to the drafting body.
Freedom of expression under the new constitution presents a more complex
problem.  Well written constitutions tend to consolidate all matters relating to a
single issue within a single provision, to the extent possible.  That approach is
not only useful for interpretation purposes, but is also helpful for any member of
the general public when consulting the text.  The Egyptian constitution does not
follow that approach.  Article 45 grants freedom of thought and opinion in absolute
terms; no limitations are provided, which by itself would be ideal to any advocate
of free speech.  The reality however is that there are many other limitations to free
speech that are peppered throughout the text, some of which are not easy to find.
  An obvious limitation is article 44, which prohibits any speech that would defame
religious messengers and prophets.  Another is provided for in article 31 according to
which insulting and showing contempt to any human being is prohibited.  There are
less obvious candidates; for example, article 198 provides that civilians can be tried
before military courts for “crimes that harm the armed forces”, which if interpreted
broadly can include accusations of corruption or mismanagement within the military.
Together, these provisions illustrate a number of problems with Egypt’s constitution.
  The first relates to the quality of the drafting.  Today, constitutions are no longer
perceived as being solely within the purview of legal scholars.  In keeping with
modern democratic practice, they are supposed to be readable and accessible by
any member of the general public, particularly in developing countries where the
free exercise of rights has been restricted in part because of a lack of access to
information.  Egypt’s constitution does not adopt that approach, as illustrated by the
provisions on freedom of expression.  The fact that one has to review the entire text
and decipher opaque provisions to understand where the limitations lie essentially
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means that an Egyptian layman has little hope of understanding where her rights lie
on her own.  In fact, even constitutional scholars who have little else to do with their
time will likely have trouble understanding how the right should be exercised under
the constitution.
Another major problem is the nature and wording of some of the limitations
themselves.  Despite concerns that have been expressed by the opposition camp,
some of the limitations are legitimate and are in fact quite common in progressive
countries (even the European Convention on Human Rights allows for speech to be
restricted to protect the reputation of others).   Also, although the prohibition against
defaming prophets is clearly not in keeping with modern comparative practice, Egypt
as a nation has the prerogative to decide whether the matter is sufficiently important
for its people to justify a limitation on speech, in the same way that the desire to
protect the reputation of others can justify such a limitation.  The difficulty lies in the
wording of the limitations themselves which is so vague that it will most probably
lead to severe restrictions on speech.  For example, the current wording of article
44 could easily be used to prevent theological debates between different religious
denominations given that, for example, denying that a particular individual was a
prophet without necessarily attributing any negative qualities to him could constitute
defamation in the minds of many.  Also, article 31 could easily prevent any type of
accusation from being made against a senior official of mismanagement or even
corruption in various circumstances, given that no distinction is made between senior
officials and the remainder of the population.
One final surprise in the new constitution is the limitations clause that makes an
appearance in article 81.  It has been common in modern history (particularly in the
Arab region) for constitutions to indicate that fundamental rights are to be regulated
by legislation, and for that same legislation to so restrict the exercise of that right that
it may as well not have been granted in the first place.  Today, many constitutions in
Africa and Latin America seek to resist that trend by including what is referred to as
limitations clauses, which provide that legislation cannot detract from the right’s very
nature.  Article 81 was first suggested as a means to achieve that same objective,
but a third paragraph was incorporated which some commentators have argued
may have the opposite effect.  It ensures that all of the rights that are provided for
in the constitution must be exercised in accordance with the constitution’s second
chapter, which is the chapter that establishes social justice as a priority and family
as the cornerstone of society.  The concern is therefore that the rights will have to be
applied and interpreted in accordance with a conservative vision of society.  Once
again, the difficulty with this provision is not that it leads Egypt down a dark path, but
that its effect is at this stage almost impossible to predict.  There are other provisions
however whose applications are clearly negative and that have caused many to
reject the constitution altogether.
The darker side
Those provisions include the section on decentralization and civil/military relations. 
These two areas have come as a surprise to many analysts because they so clearly
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fail to meet the democratic aspirations of the people and because they aim to protect
entrenched interests at the expense of the nation.
The trend towards greater decentralization is a world-wide phenomenon because
it aims to bring democracy closer to the people.  In the Arab region, the trend has
been resisted based on a number of falsehoods that have been spread by despotic
regimes.  The argument that they have used is that decentralization is one step
away from federalism, which is itself the precursor to a country breaking apart along
sectarian lines.  The truth in fact is that non-democratic regimes have used highly
centralized forms of government to maintain an iron-grip on power and control their
populations to the fullest extent possible.  As a result, Arab countries to this day
maintain amongst the most centralized forms of government in the world, where local
officials are typically appointed and dismissed at will by central ministries and where
local elections (if they take place at all) are completely meaningless.
Consequently, service delivery outside the capital is almost invariably a disaster
throughout the Arab region.  Egypt has not escaped that trend (indeed it was one
of the pioneers in establishing it in the first place) and the new constitution is no
exception in that regard.  It calls for local councils to be elected (article 188) but
allows for any of their decisions to be overturned by the central government in order
to prevent “damage to the public interest” (article 190).  Worse still, the constitution
does not indicate how governors will be chosen (whether elected or selected) and
makes no attempt to define their powers (article 187), leaving all of these crucial
matters to be decided by subsequent legislation, as has been the case for the past
few decades.  Finally, earlier drafts called for a financial redistribution mechanism
between provinces to remedy the gross disparities that exist in the country.  That
provision has now been deleted from the final version.  There is therefore nothing
stopping the former highly centralized system from continuing to operate in the
future.
Worse still are the provisions on civil/military relations.  Early on in the drafting
process, a large number of assembly members identified the need to end military
trials of civilians as a priority.  This has been a key revolutionary demand from
the start of the uprising in January 2011, and grew over time just as the military’s
influence on the state grew throughout 2011 and 2012.  Several provisions were
therefore included in various parts of the draft that called for the practice to end.  The
final draft however overturned whatever progress might have been made by explicitly
stating that civilians can be tried by military courts for crimes that “harm the armed
forces” (article 198).  The term is left to be defined by subsequent legislation.  In the
past, the practice was the product of legislation that could be overturned by new
legislation.  Today, military trials of civilians have been elevated to a constitutional
principle, making it much harder to overturn.  It would have been far better if the
constitution had remained silent on this issue.
Also surprising is the establishment of a national defense council and the powers
that have been granted to it.  In 2011, the SCAF sought to preempt the constitutional
drafting process by drafting what was referred to at the time as the “supra-
constitutional principles document”.  That document was so biased in favor of
maintaining the military’s autonomy that it led to massive protests in the country,
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which eventually resulted in dozens of deaths and thousands of wounded.  One
of the offending principles was the notion that the military’s budget should remain
secret and outside the scope of civilian oversight.  Although the SCAF’s initiative was
dropped as a result of popular opposition, that particular provision made a comeback
during the constitutional drafting process.  An early draft also maintained that the
military’s budget should appear as a single figure in the annual state budget law
without a breakdown.  That has now been watered down somewhat in the final draft,
which provides that the national defense council (which has 8 military members
and 7 civilians) is now responsible for discussing the military’s budget (article 197).
  The reference to a “single figure” has been removed and there is no indication that
the council is exclusively competent to discuss the matter, which leaves open the
possibility that the parliament may be able to review the military’s budget as well. 
The fact remains however that the military has been granted a prerogative that its
counterparts in other countries do not enjoy.  Once again, it would have been far
better had the constitution remained silent on this point.
A final word
Altogether, in comparison with Egypt’s constitutional traditions, the new text is not
the disaster that its detractors claim it is, nor is it the incredible leap forward that its
proponents have been boasting of.  It is also clear that Egypt’s constitutional reform
is far from over.  The coming parliamentary elections will determine not only how the
text will be applied, but also its prospects for surviving the coming period.
This
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